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ABSTRACT: 
This paper addresses the puzzle how employers that invest in general human capital can gain 
an information advantage with respect to the ability of their employees when training is 
certified by credible external institutions. We apply an established model from the 
employer-learning literature and distinguish between two ability dimensions: cognitive and 
work-related ability. We apply this model to the German apprenticeship system and show 
that cognitive ability certified by external institutions at that the end of apprenticeship 
training can be signalled to outside employers. Apprenticeship graduates however cannot 
signal their work-related ability – measured by a small voluntary bonus paid by the training 
employer – to the outside market. We therefore show that the information advantage on 
work-related ability explains that training employers can positively select the apprentices 
they retain. As a consequence, this information advantage induces employers to invest in 
certified and transferable human capital.  
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1 Introduction 
Scholars frequently argue that firms can invest in transferable skills of their employees 
because training generates an information advantage about employee ability (Chang and 
Wang, 1995; Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998; Autor, 2001) or training content (Katz and 
Ziderman, 1990). The information advantage drives a wedge between workers’ productivity 
and their `marketable’ or outside wage. This wedge allows training firms to get a return on 
investment and nevertheless keep their trained employees by paying them a wage below 
productivity but above market wage1. 
Indeed, numerous empirical studies report employer-sponsored training in transferable skills 
such as college, Master and MBA Courses (Cappelli, 2004; Benson et al., 2004; Pattie et al., 
2006; Manchester, 2010, 2012; Benson, 2013), language and IT courses (de Grip and 
Sauermann, 2012; Sauermann, 2015), and apprenticeship training (Mohrenweiser and Zwick, 
2009; Schönfeld et al., 2010; Ryan et al., 2013; Muehlemann et al., 2013; Kriechel et al., 
2014). Those training courses usually end with a certificate issued by an external institution 
(Acemoglu and Pischke, 2000). It is however well known that particularly marked certificates 
issued by external institutions allow outside firms to infer individual ability (Arcidiacono et 
al., 2010). This kind of company-sponsored training therefore leads to a puzzle: how can 
training firms gain information advantages if training courses are credibly certified by 
external institutions?2  
This paper provides a novel solution to solve this puzzle. Following recent developments in 
the employer learning literature3, we distinguish between cognitive and work-related ability 
of employees (Waldman, 2014). Cognitive ability is measured in standard exams that allow 
training and outside firms to assess relative performance in comparison to other training 
participants. On the contrary, work-related ability is not measured and marked in traditional 
training certificates. Work-related ability comprises soft-skills, ability to work in teams or 
                                                          
1 A number of empirical papers have recently shown a wedge between wages and performance after company-
sponsored training. Training has a larger effect on productivity than on wages in several European countries 
(Konings and Vanormelingen, 2015; Almeida and Carneiro, 2009; Dearden et al., 2006; Conti, 2005). 
2 Katz and Ziderman (1990) explicitly analyse certification and conclude that certification overcomes 
information asymmetries about training content and reduces firms’ incentive to invest in training. 
3 The employer learning literature assumes that employers are initially not able to fully assess their employees´ 
ability (and therefore productivity) but learn about it during the first years of employment.  
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behaviour towards co-workers, line managers and subordinates. Individuals learn about 
their cognitive ability already during school and are aware about it before they start an 
employment but they do not know their work-related ability before they start to work. This 
means that employer and employee learn simultaneously during employment about work-
related ability (Waldman, 1984; deVaro and Waldman, 2012; Waldman, 2014; Waldman and 
Zax, 2014; Bognanno and Melero, 2015).  
Hence, we argue that training firms gain an information advantage about work-related 
ability (private information) but not about cognitive ability (public signal) if training is 
certified by external institutions. In other words, information asymmetry on work-related 
ability can generate the necessary information advantage that creates the wedge between 
training firm and outside firm wages necessary to get a return on training investment.  
To analyse the question of information advantages of training firms after certified general 
training, we first introduce an analytical framework based on an established employer-
learning model of Schönberg (2007). The model nests symmetric and asymmetric learning. In 
the symmetric learning case, training and outside firms simultaneously learn about cognitive 
as well as work-related ability. In the asymmetric learning case, the training firm learns 
about individual work-related ability but not the outside firm4. This model allows us to derive 
hypotheses that identify information asymmetries for both ability types between training 
and outside firms based on wage offers and job mobility after training.  
Second, we empirically test these hypotheses using particularities of the German 
apprenticeship training system. The strongly regulated apprenticeship system provides 
training for around two thirds of each labour market cohort. Apprenticeship training 
requires investments by employers in transferable human capital. It ends with certificates 
issued by independent institutions. We use a unique database that contains marks of the 
final apprenticeship certificate amongst other important information from administrative 
sources for the entire population of several cohorts of apprenticeship graduates in one 
                                                          
4 Traditionally, studies on employer learning concentrate on symmetric learning about cognitive ability, for 
example Farber and Gibbons (1996), Altonji and Pierret (2001), Lange (2007), Mansur (2012), Kahn (2013), 
Kahn and Lange (2014), and Light and McGee (2015). However, Schönberg (2007), Pinkston (2009), Hu and 
Taber (2011), and Kim and Usui (2014) present models that nest symmetric and asymmetric learning about 
cognitive ability. 
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German federal state. The final marks serve as information about cognitive ability. We 
measure work-related ability with a bonus voluntarily paid by training employers on top of 
apprentices’ base salary. Comparing bonus payments between apprenticeship graduates in 
the same training firm, in the same year, and in the same occupation allows us to detect 
differences of work-related ability between a very homogeneous group of peers.  
We show that work-related ability indeed induces an information advantage of training 
firms. Bonus payments and exam marks are correlated but measure different dimensions of 
ability. They therefore both have distinct explanatory power in our entry earnings equations. 
Entry earnings of stayers after training are correlated with the bonus and final marks but 
entry earnings of movers after training are only correlated with marks but not with the 
bonus. This means that work-related ability identified by the bonus payments cannot be 
signalled to outside firms. As a consequence, training firms are able to keep a positively 
selected group of graduates. 
This paper contributes also to a number of further open topics. First, it presents a direct 
assessment of adverse selection – we show that training employers are able to positively 
select apprenticeship graduates. Since work-related ability is positively related to cognitive 
ability, staying graduates are positively selected on both ability dimensions. Hence, our 
paper complements studies that indirectly identify adverse selection (Greenwald and 
Glasspiegel, 1983; Foster and Rosenzweig, 1993), studies using displacement losses as 
indicators of adverse selection (von Wachter and Bender, 2006; Göggel and Zwick, 2012) and 
studies using cognitive ability indicators as determinants of moving to another employer 
(Schönberg, 2007). 
Second, our paper adds to recent developments in the employer learning literature. Previous 
studies analysed either employer learning on cognitive or work-related abilities. Waldman 
(2014) for the first time introduces a distinction between “academic” and “productive” 
abilities in one theoretical signalling model. Our paper provides an empirical example that it 
is indeed important to distinguish between different ability dimensions when analysing 
information asymmetries between incumbent and outside employer. 
Third, our paper proposes a new measure for work-related ability in order to identify 
information advantages of incumbent employers: the relative wage position of an 
4 
 
apprenticeship graduate in relation to peers in the same training firm, occupation, and 
cohort. A bonus is hard to observe for outside employers in comparison to the relatively 
easy to observe promotions frequently used in previous studies to identify work-related 
ability (Waldman, 1984; deVaro and Waldman, 2012; Waldman and Zax, 2014; Bognanno 
and Melero, 2015). As a consequence, our information on work-related ability may not be 
strategically distorted by training employers in order to hide high-productivity employees. In 
this sense, our indicator complements recent analyses by Kahn (2013), Kim and Usui (2014) 
and Kahn and Lange (2014) who also generate indicators for information asymmetries on the 
labour market derived from earnings trajectories between cohorts. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section presents a model on the consequences 
of symmetric and asymmetric employer learning on cognitive and work-related ability on the 
selection of employer movers and the determinants of earnings of apprenticeship graduates. 
The third section discusses our empirical strategy and the fourth section presents our data 
and variables. The fifth section shows and interprets the empirical results and the last 
section concludes. 
2 Theoretical framework 
We apply the framework of public and private information identified in the employer-
learning literature to the literature of company-sponsored training in general human capital. 
The basic idea of employer learning models is to derive testable hypotheses about 
determinants of entry earnings for stayers and movers. As we restrict our sample to a 
homogeneous group of training graduates, we can infer whether training employers learn 
simultaneously with outside firms about the ability of training graduates (this is the 
symmetric learning case) or whether training employers learn more about their ability than 
outside firms (asymmetric learning case). Asymmetric learning enables training firms to use 
the information advantage to get a return on their training investments by paying graduates 
less than productivity but more than the market wage.  
We apply the employer-learning model of Schönberg (2007) to the German apprenticeship 
training context. In the appendix, we provide a more formal derivation of the model that 
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complements the intuitive account given in this section. The model consists of two periods. 
In the first period, apprenticeship training takes place and ends with a certificate.5 The 
training employer can screen apprentices during the first period and decide whom it would 
like to offer an employment contract in the second period. In the second period, an outside 
employer can make a wage offer and the training employer can counter the offer. The 
apprenticeship graduate stays with the training employer if the wage offer is higher than the 
wage offer of the outside employer plus an individual disutility shock incurred during 
training.6 The disutility shock is not observable by the training employer but it has some 
prior about the distribution of the disutility shock. Hence, the model generates some 
voluntary turnover for exogeneous reasons (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998; Autor, 2001). 
The model distinguishes between two productivity types of workers, high and low, in two 
productivity dimensions – cognitive and work-related ability. The training employer learns 
about the individual level of both productivity dimensions during the first period. Cognitive 
ability is defined as the knowledge necessary to perform a certain trade. This ability is 
certified and marked in extensive exams supervised and marked by external institutions at 
the end of the training period. Cognitive ability is easy to observe for all market participants 
(and the researcher) and therefore public on the basis of credible certificates. In the basic 
version of the model, a high level of cognitive ability adds the same productivity to 
employees with low work-related ability as to employees with high work-related ability. The 
probability that the employee has high work-related ability is however higher when the 
employee has high cognitive ability. The a-priori probabilities of high and low work-related 
ability for the groups with high and low cognitive ability are known to outsider employers.  
Work-related ability is hard-to-observe information from the outside employers´ 
perspective. The key question is whether the information remains private or whether 
outside employers can reveal the individual work-related ability level. The revelation of 
work-related ability by the outside employer needs an additional signal such as a job 
                                                          
5 In contrast to the model by Acemoglu and Pischke (1998), the amount of training provided is given in our 
model. In the empirical section, we only compare wages of apprenticeship graduates who have been trained in 
the same firm and learnt the same occupation. It seems plausible that all apprenticeship graduates in this 
homogeneous group received the same training input. 
6 Examples for the disutility shock are problems with superiors or co-workers, the working climate in the 
training firm or changes in regional preferences (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998). Contini et al. (2011) have shown 
that an unsupportive boss leads to a six percentage point increase in voluntary turnover probability. 
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interview (Lange, 2007) because outside employers do not directly obtain reliable 
information on it. If this additional signal perfectly transmits the information on work-
related ability, outsider and incumbent training firms have the same (correct) information 
about it and we have completely symmetric employer learning with respect to work-related 
ability.7 If the additional signal is only white noise, the outside employer cannot infer 
anything about the work-related ability of the applicants in addition to the a-priori 
probability distributions of work-related ability for applicants with high and low cognitive 
ability levels. In this case, we have purely asymmetric learning.  
If outside employers can accurately assess work-related ability, incumbent and outside 
employers offer the full additional productivity as bonus for high cognitive and for high 
work-related ability. This means that only the disutility shock allocates movers and stayers. 
As the disutility shock is equally distributed over ability levels, the training employer cannot 
retain a positive selection of employees. 
If the training employer has superior information on work-related ability, the outside 
employer is not aware of and therefore not willing to pay for the full additional productivity 
associated with high work-related ability. For outside employers, the applicant has a low 
work-related ability level with a certain probability even if he or she has high cognitive 
ability. The training employer is able to pay fully the higher productivity and has the 
additional advantage that it can counter the wage offer of the outside employer because it 
has the last wage offer. In the asymmetric employer learning equilibrium, the training firm 
can offer a slightly higher wage for graduates with the high work-related ability and can keep 
them. The training firm can also select those graduates who have to leave after training – 
either, it does not give them a higher counter-offer or, it does not give them an employment 
offer after graduation. Hence, outside employers anticipate that incumbent training 
employers use their informational advantage and consider employer movers as having a 
higher risk of low work-related ability or are in other words “lemons” (Greenwald, 1986; 
Gibbons and Katz, 1991). As a consequence, the incumbent employer can pay graduates with 
high revealed work-related ability less than their productivity but more than the market. This 
difference between wages and productivity can be used to finance the training investment 
                                                          
7 This is similar to the case of symmetric learning. 
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even if some training participants with high work-related ability leave because they 
experienced a high disutility shock (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999; Leuven, 2005).  
Summing up, our model nests symmetric and asymmetric employer learning and predicts 
the following: If information is symmetric about both ability dimensions for incumbent and 
outside employers, work-related and cognitive ability have the same impact on entry wages 
for those who stay with their employer and those who leave. If incumbent employers have 
an information advantage about work-related ability, cognitive ability has a stronger impact 
on the entry wages of movers than of stayers because the outside employer can only rely on 
this public signal. However, work-related ability has a stronger impact on entry wages of 
stayers than of movers because the additional signals on this private information are weaker 
for outside employers. If information on work-related ability is asymmetric, cognitive and 
work-related ability are higher for stayers than for movers (adverse selection). Both ability 
levels are equal for stayers and movers, if information is symmetric, however. 
3 Empirical Strategy 
Institutional Background 
We use the German apprenticeship training system as an application for training in general 
human capital because it develops skills that are visible for outside employers and 
transferable between firms. Apprenticeship training in Germany traditionally provides the 
highest education degree for about two thirds of the German workforce and is therefore the 
backbone for medium skilled vocational training. Apprentices usually start the 
apprenticeship immediately after school at around age 16. The apprenticeship period for 
most of them is three or three and a half years, depending on the occupation. This means 
that the first period in our model takes several years and therefore offers enough time for 
the training employer to learn about all ability dimensions of apprentices. Apprenticeships 
are generally considered as training investments for firms (Mohrenweiser and Zwick, 2009; 
Schönfeld et al., 2010).  
Apprenticeships are strongly regulated by the state and subject to the Vocational Training 
Act and occupational specific training curricula. The Vocational Training Act describes the 
length of training, necessary equipment and requirements for training firms. Training firms 
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have to fulfil these requirements in order to get permission for apprenticeship training 
granted by the chambers of industry and commerce or the chambers of craft. Training 
curricula are published and tailor-made for each occupation and describe the minimum 
skills, which have to be acquired in each training occupation for a successful graduation. The 
basic training contents are therefore identical for all apprentices in an occupation, 
irrespective of the training firm and region. The chambers observe the quality of 
apprenticeships in each enterprise in their region and administer the final exam on the 
practical part of the skill examination. The chambers set the final exam day, which typically 
takes place on the same day for all apprentices within one occupation in a region. Each 
apprenticeship contract legally terminates at the day after the final exam and therefore all 
apprenticeship graduates in one occupation enter the labour market at the same day. The 
theoretical part of the skill examination is administered and marked by publicly funded and 
controlled vocational schools. It is important for our empirical strategy that apprentices 
receive marked certificates at the end of the training period because marks allow all 
employers to assess cognitive ability of otherwise observationally equal apprenticeship 
graduates. 
In addition, apprentices are free to choose an employer after the exam. Training costs 
reimbursement contracts for apprentices are forbidden by law. According to our model, 
training firms can always outbid an outside wage offer for those apprentices they would like 
to keep. Apprenticeship contracts are obviously no up-or-out contracts and in addition to 
that, a retention decision by the training firm is hard to observe by outside firms. Outside 
firms therefore cannot easily verify whether a job applicant had an employment offer from 
the training firm or not. Promotions during the training period also cannot be used as 
alternative signal on work-related ability. 
Dependent variables: probability to move and entry earnings 
We use two dependent variables to assess the extent and existence of asymmetric 
information on ability: a binary variable of the status as staying or leaving apprenticeship 
graduate and the entry earnings of apprenticeship graduates. Entry earnings are measured 
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in the first employment spells after graduation. These spells take clearly less than one year8. 
This means that quick employer learning cannot influence entry earnings.9 Our measure of 
entry earnings for leavers and stayers also is not biased by the influences of the business 
cycle (Kahn, 2013). Most apprenticeship graduates started and finished their apprenticeship 
at the same point in time and they do not have prior experience on the labour market. As all 
apprenticeship contracts end at the day after the final exam, training employers also have to 
offer a new employment contract with new – clearly higher – earnings for those 
apprenticeship graduates who stay with them. Therefore, earnings of leavers and stayers are 
determined at exactly the same point in time. This is an important requirement for 
measuring employer learning (Farber and Gibbons, 1996; Pinkston, 2009). 
Information on cognitive ability 
We measure cognitive ability using the final marks apprenticeship graduates receive at the 
end of the training period. Their certificate provides easily accessible and unbiased publicly 
available information10. Independent institutions (the chambers of industry and commerce 
or crafts) and government-run vocational schools administer and conduct the final exams. 
Outside employers can assess the cognitive ability of each apprentice on basis of the marks 
in several practical and theoretical subjects. Most employers who hire quitting 
apprenticeship graduates train themselves (Mohrenweiser, 2015) and they therefore have 
experience in assessing marks reported in the apprenticeship certificate and other important 
information such as school marks, the occupation and the selectivity of the training 
employer (Wagner and Zwick, 2012; Mohrenweiser and Zwick, 2015).11  
                                                          
8 The maximum spell length is less than one year. Employers have to report earnings etc. at least once a year to 
the social security but status changes from apprenticeship to regular employment require an additional report 
(a spell in our data) during a calendar year. The average duration of the entry earnings spell is 178 days. 
9 When the entry spell would be longer, it may have been possible that earnings have increased for moving 
employees who are more productive than a-priori expected. This could confound the interpretation of entry 
earnings as expected productivity before the employer gets to know the employee, see Lange (2007). 
10 We also have information on the schooling level of trainees. We include this alternative signal on cognitive 
ability (Schönberg, 2007) in our analysis in order to control for endogeneity induced by correlations between 
schooling level and marks in the final apprenticeship examinations. 
11 Also compare Arcidiacono et al. (2010) for a discussion on the role of marks and selection into the schooling 
institution for the revelation of ability. 
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Information on work-related ability 
We measure work-related ability using bonus payments of incumbent training employers on 
top of base salary. Paying a bonus for apprentices at the end of apprenticeship training is at 
first sight surprising because almost all apprentices in our sample are likely to work for 
employers with collective bargaining contracts. In collective bargaining contracts, the wages 
for apprentices in all occupations are specified and therefore employers could just pay the 
collective bargained wage for their apprentices during their training period. Nevertheless, 
paying a bonus for selected apprentices on top of the bargained wage is a wide-spread policy 
of training firms – almost all training firms differentiate their wages for observationally equal 
employees (Mohrenweiser et al., 2013). Our approach is comparable for example with the 
approach chosen by Kahn and Lange (2014) who argue that differences in wages between 
observationally equal employees partly reflect subjective productivity assessments of an 
employer.12  
For calculating the bonus, we rely on the definition of a cell of homogeneous peers. A cell 
entails apprentices in one training employer, one occupation and one graduation cohort. The 
cell therefore comprises peers who are subject to the same training instructors, training 
content, selectivity into the training job, and collective bargaining rules. Within each cell, we 
define the bonus as the difference between earnings of an apprentice and the minimum 
earnings in the cell measured at the last apprenticeship spell before graduation. 13 The bonus 
reflects the opportunity of a training employer to differentiate earnings before the end of 
apprenticeship training. As we condition on marks at the end of apprenticeship training, the 
influence of the bonus on earnings captures work-related ability such as personality, 
capability to work in teams or social skills that are not captured in apprenticeship 
certificates.  
                                                          
12 Unfortunately, we do not have information on subjective performance ratings. 
13 A number of previous studies exploit the earnings variation between apprentices close to graduation who 
learn the same occupation in the same establishment and graduation year. Some training firms pay a bonus for 
example for extra-ordinary performance to reward and reveal superior individual performance to the 
employees (Backes-Gellner and Oswald, 2014; Ryan, 2011; Ryan et al. 2013). Moreover, training employers 
frequently pay a bonus for those selected apprentices who are sent to subsidiaries abroad for some weeks, 
which can be considered as an incentive for good performance (Mohrenweiser et al., 2013). Finally, firms may 
use the bonus as a cheap possibility to increase the chance to retain positive reciprocal apprentices in the 
training firm after graduation. 
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Outside employers may observe the absolute individual earnings of an apprentice at the end 
of apprenticeship. Apprentices can however not credibly signal their relative position in the 
earnings hierarchy in relation to their peers in the training firm in order to improve their 
earnings opportunities on the labour market. Moreover, employers never reveal their 
complete earnings structure (Waldman, 1990). For outside employers, higher earnings at the 
end of the training period might be a consequence of a high bonus or of a relatively high 
earnings level for all apprentices in the training firm.14 As a consequence, the bonus is a 
private signal available only for the training employers, the apprentice and the researcher. 
Training employers do not have an incentive to strategically use the bonus payment in order 
to disguise the work-related ability of apprentices. This characteristic of our employer 
generated information for work-related ability is in contrast to publicly observable 
productivity indicators such as promotions that may be biased by strategic considerations 
(DeVaro and Waldman, 2012; Waldman, 2014; Waldman and Zax, 2014; Bognanno and 
Melero, 2015). 
Both ability measures (bonus and marks) have the advantage that they have been created 
close to the actual decision about entry earnings after graduation and not before labour 
market entry. Therefore, unobservable heterogeneity such as more training for better 
apprentices between the creation of the information and the earnings measure is no 
problem here. Moreover, the training employer determines the bonus before the marks in 
the final exams are known. In addition, marks are not given by the training employer. This 
means that both measures are determined independently and that (as we will show below) 
they measure different ability dimensions.  
In order to be able to compare the impact of the bonus and marks on entry earnings of 
movers and stayers, we have to assume according to Farber and Gibbons (1996) and 
Schönberg (2007) that the productivity assessment of the training firm is the same as that of 
the outside employer. In other words, cognitive and work-related ability have the same 
value in all jobs. This assumption seems not to be problematic in our setting because almost 
all employers that hire apprenticeship graduates also train apprentices themselves 
                                                          
14 In order not to confound relative and absolute earnings level, we also control for the average earnings level a 
training employer pays at the end of the apprenticeship period in the regressions. 
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(Mohrenweiser, 2015). Training and outside employers therefore do not seem to be 
structurally different with respect to their ability assessments and ability demands. 
Control variables 
Besides the measures for cognitive and work-related ability, a couple of additional individual 
and employer characteristics may have an impact on the probability to leave the training 
employer and on entry earnings after apprenticeship training. On the individual-level, we 
control for gender, age, nationality, and the schooling-level. These variables are common 
determinants in earnings and mobility analyses (von Wachter and Bender, 2006; Göggel and 
Zwick, 2012).  
On the training-firm level, we pursue two strategies: we either control for the most 
important employer characteristics, firm size and median earnings, or we include a cell fixed 
effect. The cell fixed effect additionally holds constant for example the training instructor, 
initial selection criteria into apprenticeship and collective bargaining rules. Training firm 
characteristics may inform the labour market about initial selection of high ability school-
leavers into high-reputation training firms. Many papers stress that apprenticeships in larger 
and well-paying enterprises are more attractive for apprenticeship candidates (Soskice, 
1994; Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998; Mohrenweiser and Zwick, 2015). These employers can 
apply stronger hiring standards and usually obtain better apprenticeship candidates. 
Graduating from well-paying and large training employers therefore may be public 
information for outside employers about the average productivity of apprentices (Wagner 
and Zwick, 2012).  
4 Data and variables 
We use the Ausbildungspanel Saarland, a data set linking Social Security Records with 
administrative exam files from the chambers of industry and commerce and chambers of 
craft in the German federal state Saarland. The data comprise the entire apprenticeship 
graduation cohorts between 1998 and 2005. We merge both data sets on the basis of the 
initial of name and surname, birthday, gender and the start date of apprenticeship.  
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From the chambers´ exam files, we use the final exam marks, the training occupation, and 
the school-leaving qualification. Training occupation and school-leaving qualification are 
more detailed in the data of the chambers than in the Social Security Records. The 
occupation code corresponds to the training occupation named in the apprenticeship 
certificate and clearly distinguishes three and three and a half year apprenticeship 
occupations.  
From the Social Security Records, we use the earnings, nationality, gender, training firm size, 
and establishment identifier. Particularly the earnings information in the Social Security 
Records is very reliable because it is reported as exact daily earnings and is used to calculate 
social security and old age pension claims. 
We detect apprenticeship graduates with a graduation identifier in the chamber data.15 We 
restrict our data to those apprentices whose apprenticeship spell in the Social Security 
Record ends close to the published chamber exam day (compare Table 1 for a detailed data 
selection procedure). We only consider graduates in full-time employment in the first job 
after apprenticeship, with earnings above the marginal income threshold and with earnings 
less than the upper Social Security earnings threshold. We further drop apprentices who are 
older than 30 years of age and apprentices who earn less than the lowest or more than the 
highest percentile in their occupation during the apprenticeship training because these 
seems to be rare misreports.16 Then, we identify peers of apprentices who learn in the same 
training establishment, occupation and graduation year (our cell definition) and calculate the 
bonus within cells. Since calculating the bonus is only possible in cells with two or more 
individuals, we drop individuals in cells with one apprenticeship graduate only. 
Starting with 20,701 apprenticeship graduates, this procedure reduces our final sample to in 
5792 individuals. The largest drop results when applying the two graduates per cell rule 
(observations drop by 58 per cent). The sample selection procedure generates an individual-
                                                          
15 The identifier for successful graduation is a big advantage of the chamber data in comparison to the Social 
Security Records that entail only the status as apprentice. Hence, relying on the Social Security Data would 
require further assumptions to distinguish a successful apprenticeship graduate from drop-outs. 
16 Apprentices can legally earn less than the marginal income threshold. Since the Social Security Data entail a 
few earnings misreports, we apply the common rule to drop these employees in order to clean the data. 
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level pooled cross-section dataset. Each remaining apprenticeship graduate enters the 
sample in the year of the first full-time employment after graduation.  
5 Findings 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 summarises the variable definitions, means and standard deviations of the variables. 
The share of employer movers immediately after apprenticeship training is around 40 per 
cent in our sample. For employer movers and stayers, Table 3 separately displays the 
descriptive statistics. Movers have worse marks in their final apprenticeship exams than 
stayers.17 They also have a significantly lower schooling background: they are less likely to 
graduate from a medium and upper secondary school track (Realschule and Abitur) and 
more likely to graduate from a lower secondary school track (Hauptschule), or without a 
school certificate. 
Similarly, movers receive a lower bonus at the end of apprenticeship training. The raw bonus 
difference is substantial with around 0.14 log points accounting for somewhat less than 10 
percent of total earnings. The absolute number of the average bonus in total daily earnings 
is small however with around 2 Euros a day (around 60 Euros a month). Movers receive on 
average a bonus that is 28 cents a day (8.40 Euros a month) lower than that of stayers. This 
small absolute number supports our argument that outside firms can usually not observe the 
bonus. Stayers receive significantly higher earnings in their first job after apprenticeship than 
movers. The raw difference is again substantial with around 0.2 log points.  
However, marks and bonus payments are correlated at a significance level below one 
percent. The pairwise correlation is reasonable but low with a value of 0.17. The correlation 
is somewhat larger for stayers with 0.18 than for movers with 0.14. This means that both 
ability indicators measure different ability dimensions and work-related ability cannot be 
easily predicted from cognitive ability. 
                                                          
17 Note that in Germany mark 1 is the best (with distinction) and mark 4 the worst assessment (just passed). For 
better interpretation, we multiply the marks by minus one. Hence, a higher number represents higher cognitive 
ability. 
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Finally, movers are significantly older and come from smaller training firms that pay lower 
earnings. We find no differences between movers and stayers with respect to nationality 
and gender. 
Positive selection of stayers 
We first test whether training firms are able to keep a positive selection of their 
apprenticeship graduates. We use a Linear Probability Model which has the advantage that 
we can include the large number of cell fixed effects and can interpret the coefficients as 
marginal effects. In addition, this regression produces usually similar marginal effects as a 
Probit or Logit regression if the dependent variable has an unconditioned probability around 
50 percent. 
We find that the relative bonus payments and the final mark are both negatively associated 
with the probability to leave the training firm (Table 4). The first three models in Table 4 
restrict the sample to cells with at least one leaving and one staying apprenticeship graduate 
in order to analyse firms that select (or are able to attract) apprentices to stay. Models 1 and 
2 take into account several individual and training establishment characteristics. An increase 
in the mark by one at the final apprenticeship exam reduces the probability to leave the 
training employer by 5.3 percentage points and a one Euro higher bonus a day reduces the 
probability to leave by 8.4 percentage points.18  
Model 3 includes cell fixed effects instead of establishment-level variables. This is our 
preferred estimation because it conditions on comparable peers learning and graduating 
under the same conditions19. The cell differences show us whether training firms are able to 
retain apprentices with the relatively best marks in comparison to their peers. The point 
estimates of bonus and marks increase in comparison to models 1 and 2. A one Euro higher 
bonus reduces the probability to leave by 14.2 percentage points and a better mark by one 
increases this probability by 9.8 percentage points. This reduction in the leaving probability 
is substantial given the unconditioned probability to leave of 40 percent. Finally, model 4 in 
                                                          
18 Since the standard deviations of both variables are quite similar, we get qualitatively the same relevance for 
marks and bonus when we apply a reduction of one standard deviation. 
19 This procedure renders marks to a private instead of a public signal since outside employers may have an 
idea about the general distribution of marks within an occupation but they do not know the relative differences 
within a cell. 
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Table 4 includes individuals in all cells, in other words even if all graduates leave or stay in 
the cell. The coefficients show comparable coefficients with regard to both productivity 
dimensions. 
The control variables in these regressions have the expected signs. We also find a positive 
selection of stayers with respect to schooling background. Graduates with a medium-track 
secondary school certificate have a lower probability to leave than graduates holding a 
lower-track secondary school degree. German citizens have a higher probability to leave 
than graduates born abroad and older graduates have a higher probability to leave than 
younger graduates. Finally, graduates in larger training firms have a lower probability to 
leave than those graduating in smaller firms.  
Hence, we can characterise employer movers after apprenticeship training as a negatively 
selected group with respect to the information on both ability dimensions.20 
Asymmetric information on work-related ability? 
Our test of asymmetric information in the labour market for apprenticeship graduates relies 
on the differentiation between the influence of work-related and cognitive ability on entry 
earnings of stayers and movers.  
Table 5 displays augmented Mincer entry earnings regressions for apprenticeship graduates 
separately for stayers and movers. The first three models show regressions for stayers and 
the latter three models show the regressions for movers. Models (1) and (2) as well as (4) 
and (5) control for individual and establishment characteristics and the models (3) and (6) 
use cell fixed effects. Including cell fixed effects improves the comparability between the 
peers in the sample at the price that we can only include cells with at least two stayers 
respectively movers. Hence, the sample is more biased against larger firms.  
We find that for stayers, the bonus has a significantly positive impact on entry earnings. A 
one Euro higher bonus a day increases the entry earnings by around 1.1 percent. For 
                                                          
20 Based on the observation that military quitters obtain comparably higher entry wages than apprenticeship 
graduates who voluntary quit and those who have been laid-off, Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) also conclude 
that there is adverse selection for quitting apprenticeship graduates in Germany. 
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movers, the bonus has no significant impact on entry earnings. On the contrary, marks in 
final exams strongly influence entry earnings. A one unit better mark increases the first full-
time earnings of movers by 4.3 percent, a smaller impact than on the entry earnings of 
stayers (1.9 percent). The regressions controlling for cell fixed effects confirm the results and 
even have higher coefficients again. 
All additional control variables show the expected signs. Females earn lower entry earnings 
than males. The school-leaving certificate is significantly positively associated with entry 
earnings for both groups but with stronger effects for movers than for stayers. This means 
that we find a pattern according to the assumption that schooling levels can also be used as 
a public signal on cognitive ability that mainly drives the entry earnings offer of outside 
employers. Furthermore, stayers in high-paying training firms (measured as the mean 
earnings-level of apprenticeship graduates in the establishment) not surprisingly also earn 
more as a skilled employee. More interestingly, apprentices leaving a high-paying training 
firm, also receive higher earnings in the first job after apprenticeship. This effect may result 
from the fact that the new employer takes into account a superior initial selection of 
apprentices by high-paying training employers that is known in local labour markets. Staying 
German nationals receive lower entry earnings than staying foreigners. Age has a positive 
impact on entry earnings for leavers only. 
Our results show that cognitive ability has a stronger influence on entry earnings for movers 
than for stayers. Marks therefore have the characteristics of a public signal or in the words 
of DeVaro and Waldman (2012) a “publicly observable ‘announcement’ of the worker´s 
ability”. On the contrary, work-related ability significantly increases the earnings of stayers 
but not of movers. This pattern fits perfectly to our interpretation of bonus payments as 
private information. Hence, training employers are not able to generate an information 
advantage about cognitive ability but about work-related ability of their apprentices. The 
apprenticeship certificate renders the information about cognitive ability into a public signal 
but outside employers have no instrument to detect work-related ability. Work-related 
ability is therefore a possible channel for training firms to create monopsony power after 
apprenticeship training.  
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Robustness checks 
It is important that we include both ability dimensions into the earnings equation in order to 
obtain the additional effect of each ability dimension on earnings. This interpretation 
however rests on the assumption that both ability dimensions are not too strongly 
correlated with each other and therefore measure different productivity dimensions. We 
therefore want to check, whether cognitive ability and work-related ability measures 
separate dimensions of productivity. If both indicators would be highly correlated, the 
addition of the second element would reduce the impact of the first element in the entry 
wage equation (Farber and Gibbons, 1996; Altonji and Pierret, 2001, DeVaro and Waldman, 
2012). The reduction in the absolute size of the coefficient should be especially strong for 
stayers as the employer can assess work-related ability. Therefore, we check the magnitude 
of the coefficients of each ability dimension when we exclude the other. Table 6 shows the 
regressions but only reports the key variables. The regressions control for the same variables 
as models 2 and 5 in Table 5. We find that the magnitude of the coefficients of marks and 
bonus remain remarkably stable when we eliminate the other (Table 6 in comparison to 
Table 5). This is an additional indicator that both indicators measure different dimensions of 
productivity. 
We then check, whether our results are robust when we reduce the sample of employer 
movers to those who are very likely to leave on exogenous reasons instead of being fired 
(compare the discussion in Gibbons and Katz, 1991). Here, we follow the argument by von 
Wachter and Bender (2006) that training employers that experience a severe short-term 
demand shock usually do not keep as many apprenticeship graduates as usually. These firms 
reduce the retention rate of apprenticeship graduates dramatically in one year but have 
comparatively high retention rates in all other years. We implement this estimation strategy 
to identify those employer movers by using two retention rate reduction thresholds: first, 
training firms that reduce the average retention by more than 50 per cent in one single year 
(model 1 in Table 7) and second, training firms with a 20 per cent reduction (model 2 in 
Table 7). Table 7 reports the key variables (marks and bonus) in the entry earnings 
regression for employer movers and controls for the same variables as model 5 in Table 4. 
We find very similar point estimates for the private information and the public signal on 
entry earnings. The bonus payments do not have a significant impact on entry earnings in 
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both sub-samples. The marks are only significant in the larger sample (model 2). The 
coefficients in the smaller sample remain quite similar in size but have low significance 
probably because the sample size is too small. We therefore conclude that we get similar 
results when we reduce our sample to mainly involuntary employer movers. 
6 Conclusions 
This paper shows that training employers in the German apprenticeship training system can 
keep graduates who are better with respect to cognitive and work-related ability. Cognitive 
ability is identified by marks in the final exams and can easily be signalled to outside 
employers. Work-related ability however cannot credibly be signalled to outside firms and 
training firms can get an information advantage about this ability dimension. The 
information advantage leads to an adverse selection of training employer movers even if 
apprenticeship training is certified and marked by external institutions.  
More specifically, training employers can base their entry earnings offer on hard to observe 
work-related ability (identified by bonus payments at the end of apprenticeship) but outside 
employers only obtain a noisy signal on this productivity dimension. Hence, work-related 
ability is only correlated with entry earnings of stayers but not of movers. On the contrary, 
training and outside employers easily observe reliable signals on cognitive ability (marks in 
the final exams). Cognitive ability has a stronger impact on the entry earnings offer of 
outside employers that can just rely on this signal, however.  
This paper provides a new explanation of information advantages of training firms even if 
training is marked and certified by external institutions. The information advantage of 
training firms about work-related ability allows them to earn a return on their investment in 
transferable human capital. They can pay highly productive employees a wage below their 
productivity. Graduates cannot signal their high work-related ability to outside employers 
and therefore do not obtain better outside options. This paper therefore is the first direct 
empirical evidence for a frequently noted but never proven assumption (Chang and Wang, 
1995; Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998; Leuven, 2005): German firms are willing to invest in 
certified, visible and transferable human capital of their apprentices because they obtain an 
information advantage on hard to observe ability dimensions. This gives training firms the 
opportunity to positively select the apprenticeship graduates they keep. However, this 
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information asymmetry reduces at the same time the incentives of individuals to invest in 
their human capital. 
Our results in addition give evidence that training firms indeed can adversely select 
employer movers after training. Apprenticeship graduates who stay with their training firm 
after graduation have better characteristics with respect to both ability dimensions in 
comparison to employer movers immediately after graduation. To the best of our 
knowledge, our paper represents the first direct empirical identification of adverse selection 
processes in labour markets and thereby complements studies on displacement losses such 
as the papers by Gibbons and Katz (1991) or more recently by Hu and Taber (2011), among 
others.  
Moreover, this paper provides a novel indicator for work-related ability. Following DeVaro 
and Waldman (2012) and Waldman (2014), we introduce an indicator that can only be 
generated by the current employer. Our indicator is based on the earnings structure within a 
peer group of apprentices in the same training employer, occupation, and graduation year. 
The relative wage position of an apprenticeship graduate in relation to the peers is hard to 
observe for outside employers in comparison for example to relatively easy to observe 
promotions usually used in the literature. Our information on work-related ability therefore 
may not be strategically distorted by training employers in order to hide high-productivity 
employees. In this sense, our indicator complements recent analyses by Kahn (2013), Kim 
and Usui (2014), and Kahn and Lange (2014) who also generate indicators for information 
asymmetries on the labour market from earnings trajectories between cohorts. 
Finally, the paper presents a relevant application of asymmetric employer learning that 
combines cognitive and work-related ability as recently proposed by Waldman (2014). It 
therefore combines two employer learning literatures that were traditionally separated in 
cognitive ability (Farber and Gibbons, 1996; Altonji and Pierret, 2001; Lange, 2007; 
Schönberg, 2007; Pinkston, 2009; Kahn, 2013; Kahn and Lange, 2014; Kim and Usui, 2014; 
Light and McGee, 2015) and work-related ability (Waldman, 1984, 1990; deVaro and 
Waldman, 2012; Waldman, 2014, Bognanno and Melero, 2015). 
Finally, many empirical papers in the employer learning literature discuss the incentive 
effects (and their social welfare consequences) to obtain signals irrespective of their 
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productivity enhancing effect (Lange, 2007; Waldman, 2014). It is beyond the scope of this 
paper but seems very interesting to assess whether the signalling value of good marks in 
apprenticeship exams induces apprentices to invest more than efficiently in their final exam 
success. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Sample Selection 
Step Number of Observations 
Successful merge between chamber and IEB data based on name 
initials, birthday, and start day of apprenticeship 
20,701 
Last apprenticeship spell in IEB in the same year as graduation 
according to chambers 
15,340 
Age below 30 at graduation, apprenticeship ends in first or 
second quarter, no negative duration between end of 
apprenticeship and start of full-time employment 
14,791 
Earnings adjustment (earnings within Social Security contribution 
range and between 50% and 200% of occupational mean at the 
end of apprenticeship) 
13,597 
At least two apprentices per cell (establishment, occupation and 
graduation year) 
5,813 
Final sample (no missings in covariates) 5,792 
Source: Ausbildungspanel Saarland 1998-2005. 
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Table 2: Definitions of variables and descriptive statistics 
Variable Definition (mean; sd) 
Mark (public signal) 
Mark in the final apprenticeship exam multiplied by 
minus 1 (-2.90; 0.74) 
Log earnings bonus during training 
(private signal) 
Log daily earnings deviation from establishment/ 
occupation/ graduation year cell minimum plus 1 in € 
(0.58; 0.77) 
Log earnings at first full-time 
employment 
Log daily earnings at first full-time employment as 
skilled worker in € (4.03; 0.32) 
Mover 
Dummy variable equals 1, if the apprentice leaves the 
training firm and finds a skilled job in the training 
occupation within 30 days after graduation (0.41; 0.49) 
Female 
Dummy variable equals 1, if apprentice is female (0.32; 
0.47) 
School certificate “Hauptschule” or 
school drop out 
Dummy variable equals 1, if apprentice graduates from 
nine year school track or does not pass the final school 
exam after nine school years (0.41; 0,49) 
School certificate “Realschule” 
Dummy variable equals 1, if apprentice graduates from 
a ten year school track (0.32; 0.47) 
School certificate “Abitur” 
Dummy variable equals 1, if the apprentice receives a 
university entrance allowance (usually after 12 or 13 
years in school) (0.26; 0.44) 
Age  Age at apprenticeship graduation (21.45; 2.01) 
German 
Dummy variable equals 1, if the apprentice has 
German nationality (0.96; 0.19) 
Establishment earnings level 
(training employer) 
Average daily apprentice earnings at the end of 
apprenticeship in € (23.12; 6.85) 
Number of employees (training 
employer) 
Number of employees in the training employer (591; 
1275) 
N = 5,792; Source: Ausbildungspanel Saarland 1998-2005. 
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Table 3: Description of differences between stayers and movers 
Variable Movers Stayers t-test 
Mark in final apprenticeship exam -3.01 -2.82 5.92 
Log earnings bonus during training  0.500 0.638 4.25 
Log earnings at first full-time 
employment 
3.942 4.109 7.91 
Female 0.331 0.324 0.25 
Lower school track “Hauptschule” or 
drop-out 
0.492 0.357 5.14 
Medium school track “Realschule” 0.289 0.345 2.18 
Upper school track “Abitur” 0.217 0.296 3.21 
Age 21.66 21.30 6.75 
German nationality 0.961 0.960 0.07 
Establishment earnings level (training 
firm) 
20.74 24.81 42.14 
Number of employees (training firm) 292 803 424 
Number of observations 2408 3384  
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1; Source: Ausbildungspanel Saarland 1998-2005. 
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Table 4: Determinants of probability to move to another employer after training. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Earnings bonus (private 
information) 
-0.093*** -0.084*** -0.142*** -0.051*** 
(6.02) (5.34) (5.20) (5.10) 
Mark (public signal) -0.043*** -0.053*** -0.098*** -0.064*** 
 
(2.77) (3.21) (3.12) (6.30) 
Female 
 
0.003 -0.023  
  
(0.09) (0.48)  
School certificate “Realschule”  
 
-0.076*** -0.140***  
  
(2.64) (2.72)  
School certificate “Abitur”  
 
-0.012 -0.102  
  
(0.31) (1.41)  
Age 
 
0.024*** 0.039***  
  
(4.20) (3.91)  
German 
 
0.168*** 0.283***  
  
(3.20) (3.09)  
Number of employees  
 
-0.000***   
  
(6.30)   
Establishment earnings level 
 
-0.002   
  
(0.96)   
Sector, Year, Occupation Yes Yes No Yes 
Cell Fixed Effects No No Yes No 
Pseudo R-sqr 0.08 0.11 0.26 0.22 
Number of Observations 2320 2320 2320 5792 
Dependent variable: Dummy equals one if the apprentice leaves the training firm after graduation, zero 
otherwise; OLS regression; reference level for school certificate: “Hauptschule”; standard errors clustered at 
the cell-level; model (1)-(3) restricted to cells with movers and stayers, model (4) includes all observations *** 
p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. Source: Ausbildungspanel Saarland 1998-2005. 
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Table 5: Determinants of first full-time skilled employment log earnings for apprenticeship 
graduates 
 
Stayers Movers 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Earnings bonus (private 
information) 
0.027*** 0.011* 0.012* 0.018* 0.008 0.016 
(4.84) (2.12) (1.72) (1.91) (0.82) (0.98) 
Mark(public signal) 0.025*** 0.019*** 0.007 0.059*** 0.043*** 0.062*** 
 
(4.66) (3.52) (0.99) (5.51) (3.93) (2.94) 
Female 
 
-0.017* -0.019* 
 
-0.030 -0.018 
 
 
(1.83) (1.87) 
 
(1.44) (0.59) 
School certificate “Realschule” 
 
0.016* -0.001 
 
0.034** 0.013 
 
 
(1.95) (0.17) 
 
(2.23) (0.52) 
School certificate “Abitur” 
 
-0.005 -0.008 
 
0.042 0.049 
 
 
(0.40) (0.53) 
 
(1.60) (1.08) 
Age 
 
0.003 0.004 
 
0.008** -0.003 
 
 
(1.66) (1.43) 
 
(2.24) (0.49) 
German  
 
-0.036** -0.008 
 
0.012 -0.013 
 
 
(2.16) (0.31) 
 
(0.35) (0.19) 
Number of employees in 
training establishment  
0.000  
 
0.000  
 
(0.68)  
 
(0.91)  
Training establishment 
earnings level  
0.014***  
 
0.008***  
 
(12.44)  
 
(4.83)  
Sector, year, occupation 
dummies Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
Cell Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes 
R2 0.60 0.65 0.88 0.35 0.36 0.58 
Number of observations 3384 3384 2846 2408 2408 1799 
Dependent variable: log daily earnings in first full-time employment after apprenticeship graduation; OLS 
regression; reference level for school certificate: “Hauptschule”; standard errors clustered at cell-level; models 
(1), (2), (4) and (5) include all observations, model (3) includes only cells with at least two stayers, model (6) 
includes only cells with at least two movers *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1; Source: Ausbildungspanel 
Saarland 1998-2005. 
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Table 6: Determinants of first full-time skilled employment log earnings, separate control for 
earnings bonus and mark 
 
Stayers Movers 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Earnings bonus (private 
information) 
0.011*** 0.012*   0.008 0.018   
(2.12) (1.72)   (0.82) (1.10)   
Mark (public signal)   0.019*** 0.007   0.043*** 0.062*** 
 
  (3.53) (1.01)   (3.93) (2.98) 
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Establishment controls Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes Non 
Sector, year, occupation 
dummies 
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Cell Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
R2 0.65 0.88 0.65 0.88 0.35 0.58 0.36 0.58 
Number observations 3384 2846 3384 2846 2408 1799 2408 1799 
Dependent variable: log daily earnings in first full-time employment after apprenticeship graduation; OLS 
regressions; standard errors clustered at cell-level; individual controls: gender, school certificate, age, 
nationality; establishment controls: median earnings and number of employees; models (1), (3), (5) and (7) 
include all observations, models (2) and (4) include only cells with at least two stayers, models (6) and (8) 
include only cells with at least two movers; *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1; Source: Ausbildungspanel 
Saarland 1998-2005. 
 
 
Table 7: Skilled entry earnings determinants of employer movers: cells with demand shock 
only 
Variable (1) (2) 
Earnings bonus (private 
information) 
0.009 0.020 
(0.12) (0.49) 
Mark deviation (public signal) 0.112 0.089* 
 
(1.18) (1.74) 
Individual controls Yes Yes 
Cell Fixed Effects No No 
R2 0.56 0.68 
Number of observations 156 511 
Dependent variable: log daily earnings in first full-time employment after apprenticeship graduation; OLS 
regression; standard errors clustered at the cell-level; individual controls: gender, school certificate, age, 
nationality, year, occupation and sector; model (1) restricted to cells with retention rate 50 percent below long-
term average, model (3) restricted to cells with retention rate 20 percent below long-term average; *** p < 
0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1; Source: Ausbildungspanel Saarland 1998-2005. 
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Mathematical appendix 
We use the following notation: The individual work-related ability measure “bonus” b can 
take two expressions, high (b = H) and low (b = L). The individual cognitive ability measure 
“mark” g can also take two expressions, excellent (g = E) and average (g = A)21. In our basic 
model, we assume that the impact of information g on productivity y is the same for 
apprentices with a low and a high level of b – this assumption is relaxed later and replaced 
by the possibility that g and b are complements22. We therefore assume that an excellent 
mark adds a constant c to productivity in comparison to an average mark. Finally, we denote 
with p the probability that an apprenticeship graduate received a low bonus. We assume 
that apprentices with excellent marks received a high bonus with a higher probability than 
apprentices with an average mark (pA > pE). Table A1 gives an overview of our model. 
Table A1: Specification of Productivity y 
 Average mark G Excellent mark G 
Low bonus b  yLA = bL yLE = bL + c 
High bonus b  yHA = bH yHE = bH + c 
Proportion low bonus p pA pE 
At the end of the training period, all employers and apprentices observe the marks of the 
apprenticeship graduates. Marks measure cognitive ability in the trade and, hence, do not 
reveal all dimensions of productivity. The missing dimension of productivity, work-related 
ability, is known to training employers and to their apprentices. Outside employers only 
observe a common noisy signal s about these privately known dimensions of individual 
productivity. An example for this signal may be the performance in a job interview (Lange, 
                                                          
21 We do not use “high“ and “low“ for the differentiation of marks in order not to unnecessarily confuse 
notation. 
22 Schönberg (2007) proofs in her appendix A6 that all previous results also hold if cognitive and work-related 
ability are complements. As a consequence, the adverse selection should be stronger for apprenticeship 
graduates with high cognitive ability, a result also derived by Acemoglu and Pischke (1998). In addition, the 
difference between the impact of work-related ability on entry wage offers of incumbent and outside 
employers should be stronger for apprenticeship graduates with high work-related ability than for 
apprenticeship graduates with low work-related ability. 
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2007). This signal can be obtained by all (interested) labour market participants and is 
independent from marks.23  
In our simple model, the potential signal s about work-related ability takes only two values, 
good (s = G) and bad (s = B). The outside employer uses the signal in order to infer the 
assessment of the incumbent employer on work-related ability of the apprenticeship 
graduate. This inference therefore is correct if an apprenticeship graduate with a good signal 
also received a high bonus and a graduate with a bad signal received a low bonus. In our 
model, q ≥ 0.5 denotes the probability that outside employers can observe the correct 
signal. According to Bayes´ Law, the outside employers compute the probability of having a 
low bonus apprentice when the information is good or bad, given the mark is excellent or 
average: 
,
,
Pr( | , ) , , , (1)
(1 )(1 )
(1 )
Pr( | , ) , , . (2)
(1 ) (1 )
k
k B
k k
k
k G
k k
p q
p L k B k A E
p q p q
p q
p L k G k A E
p q p q
  
  

  
  
 
Here, q = 1 (or symmetric information for incumbent and outside employers on the 
productivity of apprenticeship graduates) means that all low bonus apprentices generate a 
bad signal and that all high bonus apprentices generate a good signal, in other words: 
Pr(L|k,B) = 1 and Pr(L|k,G) = 0. When information is completely asymmetric (or q = 0.5), the 
probability to get a high bonus apprentice is assessed purely by the a-priori probability 
depending on the distribution of high-bonus and low-bonus apprentices, Pr(L|k,B) = 
Pr(L|k,G) = pk. 
Apprentices may have had experienced disutility θ during training that is unknown to the 
training employer – it therefore cannot compensate the apprentice for individual disutility in 
order to retain the apprentice. The disutility shock is independent of the bonus and mark 
(and the signal s). We assume that the disutility shock in the training firm is drawn from a 
                                                          
23 It is important to note that the training and the outside employers receive the same signal. In our case, it 
would be for example sufficient that the training employer knows that the apprenticeship graduate is able to 
perform well in a job interview at an outside employer. Hereby the graduate can reveal his or her social ability, 
the training firm therefore does not necessarily perform a job interview by itself in order to reveal the signal. 
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distribution with the cumulative distribution function G with an associated probability 
function g that is bounded by ,     with   > 0. The cumulative distribution function is log-
concave, which means that 
( )
1 ( )
g
G


 is non-decreasing in θ, i.e. it continuously increases 
with θ but with a decreasing rate. The expected value of disutility in the outside employer is 
zero.  
The graduate receives a wage offer from the incumbent employer (w) and from the outside 
employer (v) and takes his or her disutility at the current employer (θ) into account for the 
decision whether to stay with the incumbent employer after training or not. In other words, 
the apprenticeship graduate stays with the training employer only if w + θ > v. 
The incumbent employer has the advantage that it can make counteroffers to those 
apprenticeship graduates it wants to retain when w < v24. The outside employer does not 
observe the wage offer of the training employer w and therefore a bidding war on 
apprenticeship graduates is not possible (Pinkston, 2009).  
The training employer instead maximises the difference between productivity yik (that 
depends on bonus and marks according to Table A1) and wik,s (that additionally depends on 
the signal), taking marks g, the productivity signal s, and the probability that the 
apprenticeship graduate stays with the training employer given v and the distribution of θ 
into account. The probability that the apprenticeship graduate stays therefore can be 
written as Pr(stay|g,s) = 1 – G(vg,s – wg,s) with g = A,E, and s = B,G. The outside employers 
offer a wage taking into account marks g and signal s. The training employer therefore 
maximises profits by setting wages according to: 
 , , , ,max 1 ( ) with , ; , ; , .g s g s g s g g sb b b bw G v w y w b L H g A E s B G         
                                                          
24 Note that apprenticeship graduates with θ > 0 leave the training firm if w = v and therefore the training firm 
has to offer a higher wage than the outside firm in order to reduce the risk of losing the trained apprenticeship 
graduate.  
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The first-order condition shows that the incumbent employer pays according to the 
productivity of the apprenticeship graduate minus an expression that decreases with 
disutility θ: 
 , ,
,
, ,
1
. (3)
( )
g s g s
bg s g
b b g s g s
b
G v w
w y
g v w
 
 

 
Outside employers pay the expected productivity of those apprenticeship graduates who 
switch firms after they received both wage offers. Outside employers can freely offer wages 
and even poach on the labour market for apprenticeship graduates, i.e. pay a wage that is 
higher than the wage the apprenticeship graduate would have earned when staying in the 
training firm. Apprenticeship graduates in addition do not have to refund training 
investments when they directly leave the training firm after graduation. In addition, there 
are usually more than one outside employer interested in the apprenticeship graduates. 
Outside employers cannot make a profit in the long run, accordingly. The outside wage 
offered can be written as: 
, , , , , ,
,
, , , , , ,
Pr( | , ) Pr( | , ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
(4)
Pr( | , ) Pr( | , ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
g g g s g s g s g g s g s g s g
g s L H L L H H
g s g s g s g s g s g s
L H
L move s y H move s y p G v w y p G v w y
v
L move s H move s p G v w p G v w
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 
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with pg,s according to equations (1) and (2).  
Now, we can derive implications of symmetric and asymmetric information on the 
coefficients of the private and public productivity information for the entry wages of leaving 
and staying apprenticeship graduates. When information on apprenticeship graduates is 
symmetric (q = 1), signal s completely reveals the bonus payment and therefore the work-
related ability assessment of the training firm, i.e. pk,B = 1 and pk,G = 0. Outside employers 
therefore offer vHk = yHk if the apprenticeship graduates sends a good signal, and vLk = yLk if 
the apprenticeship graduate sends a bad signal. As the productivity difference between high- 
and low-bonus apprenticeship graduates is a constant (bH - bL = Δ) that is independent of 
marks, the training employer offers worker´s productivity minus this constant, wbk = ybk – Δ. 
In other words, the wage offer w increases by the full amount of the productivity difference 
between low- and high-bonus apprenticeship graduates. As a consequence, also the 
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difference between training and outside employers´ wage offers is equal and low- and high-
bonus apprenticeship graduates have the same probability of leaving the incumbent 
employer: 
vLk – wLk = vHk - wHk. (5) 
When the information is asymmetric (q < 1), the difference in the wage offer of outside 
employers between high-bonus and low-bonus apprenticeship graduates is smaller than Δ 
because a certain share of apprenticeship graduates with a good signal obtained a low 
bonus. Hence, high-bonus apprenticeship graduates have a smaller incentive to leave the 
training employer voluntarily than low-bonus apprenticeship graduates. This leads to 
adverse selection of movers and outside employers anticipate that training firms use their 
informational advantage and consider movers as having a higher risk to be “lemons”. The 
formal argument is as follows: The probability that a low-bonus apprenticeship graduate 
leaves the incumbent employer equals: 
   (1 ) , (6)B B G GL LqG v w q G v w     
and the probability that a high-bonus apprenticeship graduate leaves the incumbent 
employer equals: 
   (1 ) . (7)G G B BH HqG v w q G v w     
Therefore the following two conditions are sufficient for the quit rate of low-bonus 
apprenticeship graduates to be higher than that of high-bonus apprenticeship graduates: 
   
   
0 , (8)
0 . (9)
B B G G G B G B
L H H L
G G B B G B G B
L H L H
G v w G v w w w v v
G v w G v w w w v v
       
       
 
When q < 1, low-bonus apprenticeship graduates are more likely to leave the training 
employer than high-bonus apprenticeship graduates. This is unconditional on the signal 
observed by the outside employer. The probabilities that a low-bonus and a high-bonus 
apprenticeship graduate leave the training employer are according to equations (6) and (7). 
Therefore inequalities (8) and (9) have to hold in order to get a higher quit rate of a low-
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bonus apprenticeship graduate than of a high-bonus apprenticeship graduate. When we 
assume q = 0.5, the outside employer offers the same wage for low-bonus and high-bonus 
apprenticeship graduates, the training employer however offers a higher wage for high-
bonus than for low-bonus apprenticeship graduates. Therefore inequality (8) always holds 
because wHG – wLG > 0 and vG – vB = 0. If q = 1, wHG – wLG = vG – vB = aH - aL. If we can show 
that for  0.5 ≤ q < 1, the difference between the wage mark-up for high-bonus 
apprenticeship graduates and low-bonus apprenticeship graduates increases stronger with 
better information quality of the signal q for outside employers than for training employers 
(d[(wHG – wLG) – (vG – vB)]/dq < 0), then inequality (8) holds irrespectively of the signal 
quality. This is the case, if the difference between the wage offers for high-bonus 
apprenticeship graduates decreases with signal quality (d(wHG – vG)/dq < 0) and at the same 
time, the difference between the wage offers for low-bonus apprenticeship graduates 
increases with the signal quality (d(vG – wLB)/dq < 0). If we totally differentiate the first-order 
wage setting condition (3) for the training firms, we obtain: 
  
2 ´ 2
2 ´ 2
(1 ) /
.
1 1 /
s s s ss s
i i i ii
s s s s
i i i i
g G g gdw dv
dq dqg G g g
   
    
  
By log-concavity of G, the expressions in the square brackets are larger than zero and dvs/dq 
is multiplied by a number smaller than one. 
Next, consider inequality (9). For q = 0.5, the condition is satisfied, because the left-hand 
side is zero and the right-hand side is negative. The analogous requirements for 0.5 ≤ q < 
1are d(vG – wLG)/dq < 0 and d(wHB – vB)/dq < 0. That these conditions hold under the 
assumption of log-concavity of G has been shown to hold for inequality (8). Therefore, low-
bonus apprenticeship graduates are more likely to leave the training employer unconditional 
on the signal observed under asymmetric information. In other words, with information 
symmetry, low- and high-bonus apprenticeship graduates have the same probability to quit. 
With information asymmetry, the chances of low-bonus apprenticeship graduates to leave 
the training employer are higher.25 
                                                          
25 DeVaro and Waldman (2012) argue analogously that adverse selection of employer movers can be detected 
by a negative influence of performance ratings on the probability to quit given all other observable employee 
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We can turn now to the main feature of the model – the influence of bonus and marks on 
entry wages of apprenticeship graduates under symmetric and asymmetric information. 
From equation (5), it is clear that the bonus has the same impact on outside and training 
employer wage offers under information symmetry. With asymmetric information, wage 
offers of training employers vary more with bonus than wage offers of outside employers. 
The difference between expected wage offers w for high-bonus and low-bonus 
apprenticeship graduates equals:  
E[w|H] – E[w|L] = [qwHG+(1-q)wHB] – [qwLB + (1-q)wLG]. 
The difference between the wage offers v for high- and low-bonus apprenticeship graduates 
however equals: 
E[v|H] – E[v|L] = [qvG+(1-q)vB] – [qvB + (1-q)vG]. 
Therefore, wHG – wLB + vB – vG > 0 and vG - wLG + wHB – vB > 0. These inequalities correspond to 
the conditions for the quit rate of low-bonus apprenticeship graduates to be higher than the 
quit rate of high-bonus apprenticeship graduates in the asymmetric information case, 
compare equations (6) and (7).  
The impact of marks on entry wages is again the same for training and outside employers 
under symmetric information. Conditional on the bonus, the difference between outside 
wage offers for apprenticeship graduates with average and excellent marks is the full 
productivity mark-up (yiE – yiA = c). In the case of asymmetric information, the wage offers of 
outside employers to apprenticeship graduates with a good mark not only reflect the 
productivity-enhancing effect of having a good mark, but also the fact that apprentices with 
good marks have a higher probability to have a high bonus pE than apprentices with low 
marks pA. 
Analogously to Appendix A5 in Schönberg (2007), the proof is presented for low-productivity 
apprenticeship graduates. The average difference between wage offers of training 
employers for apprenticeship graduates with excellent and average marks equals: 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
characteristics such as schooling, tenure, and job level. We use bonus payment as a measure of performance 
ratings. 
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The analogous wage difference between wage offers of the outside employers equals: 
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We therefore need to show that the differences (A1) < (A2) or in other words wLE,s – wLA,s < 
vE,s – vA,s for s = G,B. Since an excellent mark has the same impact on productivity for low-
productivity and high-productivity workers, we find that: 
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The total differentiation of the wage maximisation problem of training firms (equation (3)) 
leads to: 
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Log-concavity of G gives 
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   Therefore an excellent mark has a higher 
impact on the wage offers of the outside employers than on the wage offers of training 
employers for low-productivity and high-productivity apprenticeship graduates. 
